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THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: "GRAND
DEPOSITORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE"?
JOEL FRANcIs PASCHAL*
When Edmond Randolph opened the main business of the Philadelphia Con-
vention on May 29, 1787, he recited the usual criticisms of the Articles of Confed-
eration; he then "proceeded to the remedy; the basis of which, he said, must be the
republican principle."' What Randolph meant in terms of political institutions
appears quite clearly in the Virginia Plan he was about to propose. The whole
governmental structure was to be founded on a popularly elected "first branch"
of the legislature, which was to choose the "second" from nominees proposed by the
state legislatures. The two together were to name the executive and the judiciary.
By providing for the popular election of the "first branch," the Plan made the
necessary recognition of the compelling notion of the sovereignty of the people. The
House of Representatives stands today as the most obvious result of this recognition.
Massive changes were wrought, of course, in the scheme that Randolph offered.
But the Convention, throughout its deliberations, clung to the Virginia resolve to
suffuse the first branch with a democratic quality. It declined to sanction property
qualifications for either electors or elected. It refused to subject new states to an
inequality in representation. And it repeatedly approved the election of repre-
sentatives by the people. In the discussions raised by the issue of popular
election, we get the best idea of the framers' conception of the House of Repre-
sentatives. There was some sentiment for election by the state legislatures. Roger
Sherman, for example, complained that the people "want information and are
constantly liable to be misled."' Elbridge Gerry, deploring the "excess of democracy,"
offered only wavering support.3 Madison, James Wilson, and George Mason, how-
ever, voiced opposing views in the strongest possible terms. Madison was con-
vinced that popular election was "essential," that "the great fabric to be raised would
be more stable and durable if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people
themselves .... ,,4 Wilson likewise deemed popular election essential and added the
thought that the legislature should be "the most exact transcript of the whole so-
ciety."5  But the most significant statement was- that of George Mason who pro-
jected a conception of the House of Representatives which has been preeminent from
that day to this. As Madison has it,'
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'V THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 [hereinafter ELLIOT'S
DEBATES] 127 (Jonathan Elliot ed. r937).
'Id. at 136. 3Ibid. 'Id. at 137. 'Id. at 16o.
'Id. at 136. Later, Mason added: "The requisites in actual representation are, that the Repre-
sentatives should sympathize with their constituents; should think as they think, and feel as they feel;
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Mr. MASON argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people. It was
to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the government ... It ought to
know and sympathize with every part of the community, and ought therefore to be taken,
not only from different parts of the whole republic, but also from different districts of
the larger members of it; which had in several instances, particularly in Virginia, different
interest and views arising from difference of produce, of habits, &c. &c.
Two further steps were taken to insure the democratic character of the House:
(i) The provision requiring "apportionment among the several states.., according
to their respective numbers,"7 and (2) the provision giving Congress ultimate control
of "the times, places and manner of holding elections."' The composition of the
apportionment population was, of course, the subject of the great compromise of
the Convention. In allowing three-fifths of the slaves to be included, the Convention
made a necessary concession to the representation of property in the House. But
the grand design of a House of Representatives springing directly from the people
remained. And the adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments re-
moved the original blemish
The language adopted in respect to Congressional control of elections reads as
follows:
The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall
be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the congress may at any time
by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators.
These words have provoked protracted controversy practically everywhere except
on the floor of the Convention. It is true that the South Carolina delegates did
make objection but they had not enough support to force a formal vote on this
point.Y The Convention was, according to the later testimony of Roger Sherman,
"very unanimous."'"
The provision, first proposed to the Convention by the Committee on Detail,12
was explained by Madison in the following terms:'3
The necessity of a general government supposes that the state legislatures will sometimes
fail or refuse to consult the common interest at the expense of their local convenience or
prejudices. The policy of referring the appointment of the House of Representatives to
and that for these purposes they should be residents among them." Id. at 161.
That Representatives would be elected by districts appears to have been generally assumed at Phila-
delphia. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney asserted election by districts "must be the mode intended." Id.
at 223.
On the other hand, in the New York Convention, Melancthon Smith was apprehensive lest Congress
should prevent election by districts. If this should happen, he argued, the "whole number of repre-
sentatives might . .. be taken from a small part of the state, and the bulk of the people, therefore,
might not be fully represented." II ELLIOT'S DEBATES 327.
"U. S. CONST. Art. I, §2. 'Id. §4, cl. a.
o By abolishing slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment rendered the three-fifths clause inoperative. And
the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment, by commanding that the "whole number of persons
in each state, excluding Indians not taxed" be counted, expressly repeals the clause.
0 V ELLior's DEBATES 4o-402.
"I THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 8oo (1834).
" V ELLIOT'S DEBATES 377. " Id. at 401-402. (Italics supplied.)
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the people, and not to the legislatures of the states, supposes that the result will be somewhat
influenced by the mode. This view of the question seems to decide that the legislatures of
the states ought not to have the uncontrolled right of regulating the times, places, and
manner, of holding elections. These were words of great latitude. It was impossible
to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power. Whether the
electors should vote by ballot, or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that place,
should be divided into districts; or all meet at one place, should all vote for all the repre-
sentatives, or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district,-these, and many
other points, would depend on the legislatures, and might materially affect the appoint-
ments. . . . Besides, the inequality of the representation in the legislatures of particular
states would produce a like inequality in their representation in the national legislature, as
it was presumable that the counties having the power in the former case would secure it
to themselves in the latter.
This constitutes almost the entire discussion of Article I, Section 4 in the Phila-
delphia Convention.' 4 But when the new Constitution was submitted to public
scrutiny, this section drew attention at once.' 5 The opponents of ratification charged
that Congress had complete authority to make any regulation it might choose in
respect to Congressional elections.' 6 In Pennsylvania, it was said that Congress might
order the election for the entire state to be held in Pittsburgh. In Massachusetts, it
was suggested that the place might be "Great Barrington or Machias." Property
qualifications, inconvenient times of elections, and all kinds of plots by Congress to
continue itself in power were imagined. The result of all this protest was that in
six states,17 an amendment was proposed confining the power of Congress to those
occasions when a state should neglect or refuse or be unable to act for itself. Two
others, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, were willing for Congress to retain the
authority in the above instances and also when the state legislature should make "reg-
"Earlier, when the manner of choosing the first branch was being considered, Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney proposed election as the state legislatures might direct. Being defeated in this motion, he then
moved for election "by the people in such mode as the legislatures should direct." However, he
abandoned this motion when it was "hinted that such a provision might be more properly tried in the
detail of the plan." Id. at 223-224.
" Besides the numerous discussions in the various ratification conventions and those in The Federalist,
Nos. 44, 59-61, see Noah Webster's Examination (which appeared in October, 1787), in PAUL L. FonD,
PAMPILETS ON TE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 44 (1888). Webster asks: "What did the
Convention mean by giving Congress power to make regulations, prescribed by the legislatures? Is
this expression accurate or intelligible? But the word alter is very intelligible and the clause puts the
election of Representatives wholly and the senators almost wholly, in the power of Congress.
"The views of the convention I believe to be perfectly upright-They might mean to place the election
of representatives and senators beyond the reach of faction-They doubtless had good reasons, in their
minds, for the clause .. "
"6Patrick Henry in the Virginia convention expressed his apprehensions as follows: "Congress is
to have a discretionary control over the time, place, and manner of elections. The representatives are
to be elected, consequently, when and where they please. . . . The power over the manner admits of
the most dangerous latitude. They may modify it as they please." III Etsao'r's DEBATES 175-176. Samuel
Nason in Massachusetts was equally extreme: "We now come, sir, to the 4 th section. Let us see:
the time, place, and manner of holding elections, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature
thereof. No objections to this: but, sir, after the flash of lightning comes the peal of thunder. But
Congress may at any time alter them," &c. "Here it is, Mr. President: this is the article which is to
make Congress omnipotent." II ELLIoT's DEBATES 135-136.
"South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, and Rhode Island.
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ulations subversive of the rights of the people to a free and equal representation" in
Congress.'8
The proposed amendments directly reflect the arguments used by the proponents
of the Constitution. The Federalist, for example, asserted that Congress must have
the ultimate power over elections or else Congress could be faced with the prospect
of its own dissolution through the failure of the states to act, either because of
neglect or inability.'9 This argument was repeated in practically every ratifying
convention, notably by Madison in Virginia. But Madison went on to argue that
the power was also necessary in the event states should so act as to produce unfak
and unrepresentative results. ° He referred particularly to the situation in South
Carolina as did Rufus King in the Massachusetts convention. By the constitution of
South Carolina, said King,& '
the city of Charleston has a right to send thirty representatives to the General Assembly;
the whole number of which amounts to two hundred. The back parts of Carolina have
increased greatly since the adoption of their constitution, and have frequently attempted an
alteration of this unequal mode of representation but the members from Charleston, having
the balance so much in their favor, will not consent to an alteration; and we see that the
delegates from Carolina in Congress have always been chosen by the delegates of that
city. The representatives, therefore, from that state, will not be chosen by the people
but will be the representatives of a faction of that state. If the general government cannot
control in this case, how are the people secure?
Even in South Carolina, the Charlestonian Charles Cotesworth Pinckney assured
the convention that it was "absolutely necessary that Congress should have this
superintending power, lest, by the intrigues of a ruling faction in a state, the mem-
bers of the House of Representatives should not really represent the people of the
state.... "2 2  There is also evidence of strong popular attachment to the provision.
In Massachusetts, George Cabot told the convention:23
I am, sir, one of the people; such I shall continue; and, with their feelings, I hold "that
the right of electing persons to represent the people in the federal government, is an im-
portant and sacred right." . . . for my own part, I confess that I prize the 4 th section
as highly as any in the Constitution; because I consider the democratic branch of the
national government, the branch chosen immediately for the people, as intended to be
a check on the federal branch ... and if the state legislatures are suffered to regulate con-
clusively the elections of the democratic branch, they may by such an interference, first
weaken, and at last destroy, that check, they may at first diminish, and finally annihilate,
that control of the general government, which the people ought always to have through
their immediate representatives. As one of the people, therefore, I repeat that, in my mind,
the 4 th section is to be as highly prized as any in the Constitution.
"8 See II ELLIso's DEBATES 177, for the whole of the Massachusetts amendment. The New Hamp-
shire proposal was identical.
1
"No. 59 (Hamilton). "Ill EiLuoT's DEBATES 367.
II id. at 5o-5i. James Wilson also spoke of the possibility of a state making "improper" regulations
which would require correction. See H1 id. at 441.
22 IV ELLIOT's DEBATES 303. Pinckney's defense of this clause is all the more persuasive because
of his prior opposition at Philadelphia. See note 14 supra.
" II ELLior's DEBATES 25-26.
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One further item is significant in the interpretation of Section 4. When the
first Congress met, along with other amendments proposed, it considered one re-
stricting the power of Congress over elections. Originally, it confined Congressional
power to those occasions when the states should fail to act because of either neglect
or inability. Later it was revised to take care of the case when a state might make
an "improper" regulation. But even with this broad concession the proposal failed
on the floor of the House2 4
The foregoing review establishes conclusively that the well-understood purposes
Df the Philadelphia Convention in stipulating that Congress might "make or alter"
regulations as to the times, places, and manner of Congressional elections were, at a
minimum, to secure to Congress (i) the power to make any regulations a state
might make, when a state, for any reason, should fail to act; and (a) the power to
act when a state law should be subversive of an equal and fair representation. What
measures Congress might take to achieve these purposes are not clear. As Madi-
son said, the provision was in words of "great latitude." Madison did suggest to
the Virginia Convention that "particular regulations" would be left to the state
government and "general regulations" to Congress 5 But this was hardly more
than a statement of policy. The truth of the matter is that no limits were dis-
cerned in the authority granted because none was suggested in the provision itself.
The Senate was seen as some security against abuse but the chief trust was placed
in the democratic process 2
II
Aside from the controversy over the method to be used, the legislative history of
apportionment down to 1842 is notable chiefly for the steady growth in the size of
the House of Representatives 7 The various apportionment acts, passed regularly
every decade, contained only a simple listing of the number of representatives to
which each state was entitled. The size of the House had been the subject of much
contention in 1787 and 1788. Fears were frequently expressed that the 65 member
"I ThE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN TE CoNGREss oF TM UNITED STATEs 797-8oo (1834).
Theodore Sedgewick proposed the retention of the power to deal with unsatisfactory state regulations, re-
marking that "as much injury might result to the Union from improper regulations, as from a neglect
or refusal to make any." Id. at 8oo. His suggestion was accepted with little opposition, although it
was recognized that it left full power in Congress.
I1 ELuorr's DEBATES 367.
"
6 THE FEDERAIsr, Nos. 59-61 (Hamilton). In the Massachusetts convention tyrannicide was sug-
gested as the proper expedient by Captain Isaac Snow. "Gentlemen have talked," he said, "about Con-
gress moving the place of election from Georgia to the Mohawk river; but I never can believe it. I will
venture to conjecture we shall have some honest men in our Congress. AVe read that there were two who
brought a good report-Caleb and Joshua. Now if there are but two in Congress who are honest men,
and Congress should attempt to do what the gentlemen say they will, (which will be high treason,) they
will bring a report of it; and I stand ready to leave my wife and family, sling my knapsack, travel
westward, to cut their heads off." 11 ELLi'rs DEBATES 34.
"'It should be mentioned that an apportionment bill was the target of the first presidential veto,
partly on constitutional grounds. Besides objecting to the ratio employed in the bill, Washington thought
it contrary to the provision limiting the number of Representatives to no more than one for every 30,000.
He reached this conclusion by applying the prohibition to each state individually. See MEsSAGES AND
PAPERS OF TEE PRESIDENTS 124 (Richardson ed. 1896).
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body established by the Constitution was so small that it could be easily subverted. 8
And even if not, it was said that so small a number were utterly incapable of repre-
senting effectively the people of so vast a domain. The result was that a consti-
tutional amendment was submitted to the states by the first Congress providing for
an increase in the House to at least 2o0.29 The amendment not being ratified, Con-
gress in 1792 set the membership at io5?3 Thereafter, it was successively 141, 183,
212, and in x83o, 2431 Despite this increase, the ratio likewise continued to grow,
advancing from 33,000 in i79o to 47,700 in i83o. The apportionment bill passed in
i842 after the sixth census is unique in that it reduced, to 233, the membership of
the House
2
This bill's most notable feature, however, was its second section which read:
That in every case where a State is entitled to more than one Representative, the number
to which each State shall be entitled, under this apportionment, shall be elected by districts,
composed of contiguous territory, equal in number to the number of Representatives to
which said State may be entitled; no one district electing more than one Representative.
As the first attempt by Congress to legislate under Article I, Section 4, this
provision touched off a violent two-year controversy. The Congressional debates
do not clearly reveal the political considerations which prompted Congress to act
after more than fifty years of passivity. The measure was proposed by John Camp-
bell, a Democrat from South Carolina, but the Whigs were its chief advocates, Camp-
bell drawing practically no support from his Democratic colleagues.
It was said on the floor of the House that the new law was needed to thwart
the growth of the general-ticket system, that single member districts had been
assumed at the time of the Constitution, but that small states, perceiving a political
advantage for themselves if all their representatives should be of the same party,
had embraced the general-ticket system. The larger states, electing by districts and
thereby returning a divided delegation, were then no more influential than the
smaller ones. It was feared, therefore, if nothing was done, that the large states also
would embrace the general-ticket system, and thus convert the House of Representa-
tives to an assemblage of the states and not the people as originally intended 3
Opponents of the bill countered with the assertion that the Whigs were motivated
only by a desire to add to their representation.
The bill, while it would have affected all the states, bore most heavily on Ala-
bama, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Rhode
Island, where the general-ticket system prevailed. Something of a crisis was pre-
cipitated when four of these states, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, and New Hamp-
2 The question was thoroughly debated at Philadelphia and in the various state conventions. The
debate in New York, led by Melancthon Smith on one side and Hamilton on the other, is as full as any.
See II ELLio's DEBATES 243-260. See also TH FEDERALisr, Nos. 55-57 (Hamilton).
29 1 STAT. 97 (789).
soI STAT. 253 (1792).
12 STAT. 128 (18o2), 2 STAT. 669 (i8kl), 3 STAT. 651 (1822), 4 STAT. 516 (1832).
25 STAT. 491 (1842).
"CONG. GLOBE, 27 th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 343, 493, 513 (1842).
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shire, refused to bow to what was called the Congressional "mandamus." In the
election of I842, these states persisted in the general-ticket system and the Twenty-
eighth Congress was faced with the problem of dealing with their recalcitrance. 4
While the ultimate result had already been determined by the return of the Demo-
crats to power,35 elaborate constitutional justifications were offered by each side, as
had been the case when the bill was passed.30
The argument of the opponents of the bill centered on two propositions: (x)
that Congress had no authority except when a state had failed to make any pro-
vision at all for the election of representatives; and (2) that, admitting that
Congress had the authority, it must exercise it completely and not call on the states
for ancillary legislation. The first proposition was sustained by an outrageously
" Several of the states, while adhering to the district system, adopted resolutions denouncing the
interference of Congress. See, e.g., the resolution in New York of September 5, 1842, and that of
Ohio of December 26, 1842 when Congress was assured that if Ohio did district, "it will not be through
any assent to the power assumed."
" "Mr. Kennedy [of Indiana] said that ... he would venture to make one prediction, and that was,
when the vote came to be taken, all the Whig members would vote against the gentlemen who were
elected under the general ticket system, and all the democratic members would vote for them. He saw
no use in a protracted discussion." CoNo. GLOBE, 28th Cong., ist Sess. 240 (1844).
" The opponents of the bill argued, among other things: (i) That the supervisory power was limited
to a very narrow construction of the term "holding elections," so that it was the method of voting
which Congress could control; (2) that perhaps a general-ticket system was the only constitutional
arrangement in that the Constitution said (Art. 1, §2, cl. 1) that "The house of representatives shall be
composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states"; and (3) that Con-
gress could no more require districts for representatives than it could prescribe that senators be chosen
by localized groups of state legislators, Congress having the same power in both instances.
Garrett Davis of Kentucky answered the last two of these arguments as follows:
"Among the fundamental provisions of that instrument [the Constitution] are 'The House of Repre-
sentatives shall be composed of members elected every second year by the people of the several States,' &c.;
and 'The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the
Legislatures thereof for six years,' &c. It has been lately assumed, that the clause relating to the
House of Representatives establishes the general ticket as the mode by which its members are to be
elected; and this strange position it has been attempted to enforce by a more strange argument, deduced
from the one concerning Senators. The plain object of these two provisions is to establish the body of
electors of the two Houses, and not to prescribe the manner of choosing their members. But the argu-
ment is this: that the members of the State Legislatures cannot be divided into two classes, and the
election of a Senator be assigned to each; and as the people of the States are to elect their Representatives,
they cannot be divided into districts, and those residing in a district be restricted to vote for a single
Representative, but all have the right to vote for all the Representatives of the State. If such reasoning
be entitled to a serious answer, it may be said that Senators are not to be chosen by the members of the
State Legislatures, but by the Legislatures; and the body of the two Houses must be convened and organized
in General Assembly to constitute a Legislature. On the other hand, Representatives are to be elected, not
by the States, but by the people of the States; and these phrases are to be received as they were uni-
versally understood when the constitution was formed; and the right created by them may be exercised
in the form in which ever since, until the present time, it has been recognized to exist by all. The
people of the States, respectively, then elected, as they now do, the most numerous branch of their
Legislatures; yet the whole people never voted for all the members of which it consisted, nor, indeed, for
as many candidates. The position that the House of Representatives must be chosen by all the people
of the several States, would prove too much for the purposes of its advocates. If the mode of electing
Representatives is to be deduced from this clause of the constitution, it establishes one much beyond the
general ticket-it results, inevitably, that all the people of a State must not only vote for as many persons
as it may be entitled to have Representatives, but each Representative must be chosen by the whole
people. A majority, barely more numerous than the minority, voting by general ticket for as many
persons as the number of Representatives of a State, would not be all the people of such State voting
for, much less choosing all her Representatives." REPORT OF THE MINORITY, H. R. REP. No. 60, 28th
Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1844).
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partial review of the ratification proceedings. The passages from The Federalist
and Elliot's Debates giving color of support were quoted in full while contrary
opinion was blandly ignored. Nathan Clifford, later a Supreme Court Justice, was
one of the chief offenders in this respect. Clifford weakly contended that amend-
ments were proposed "out of abundant caution to guard against the danger of
misconstruction," and that they failed only because assurance was given that the
power would be used solely to prevent the government's dissolutionY
7
The second proposition was advanced most strongly by Stephen A. Douglas,
making his first appearance on the national stage. Douglas was the author of the
report of the Elections Committee to which the case of the general-ticket repre-
sentatives was referred. The Committee offered the following resolution: 8
That the second section of "An act for the apportionment of Representatives among
the several States, according to the sixth census," approved June 25, 1842, is not a law
made in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, and valid, operative, and
binding upon the States.
In the Committee report, Douglas went so far as to acknowledge that Congress
might act, not only when the states neglected to do so, but whenever they acted
"in such a manner as would subvert the rights of the people to a free and fair
representation." But, he was quick to add, Congress had no "authority to instruct
the State Legislatures in respect to the manner in which they shall perform the
duties imposed upon them by the Constitution." Douglas pointed out that the law
of 1842 did not3 9
district the States, nor provide for an election by general ticket; does not prescribe the
mode of voting; does not fix the times, places, or manner of holding elections; does not
make such alterations in the State laws, or enact new ones, which would enable the
people to elect their Representatives. It is entirely nugatory and inoperative without
the aid of State legislation....
Congress, he argued, must make provision for the execution of its own laws without
commanding the states to come to its aid. Otherwise the great evil of the Articles
would be revived. There would be unendurable collisions between the Federal
and State Governments. The great aim of the Constitution, said Douglas, was to
prevent such collisions by assigning the two sovereignties to separate and distinct
spheres. Only by adherence to this "grand fundamental principle" could the
Union be preserved.
The answer to Douglas and his followers was delivered by Garrett Davis of
Kentucky. His report quotes enough of what was said and done at the time of the
ratifications to show the almost limitless power which practicaly everyone assumed
"' CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 349 (1843). The only clear support for this argument
which I have found is Madison's statement in The Federalist, No. 44 at 357 (Hamilton 1866): ".... the
election of the House of Representatives .. . will, probably, for ever be conducted by the officers, and
according to the laws of the States."
" RELATIVE To THE RIGHT OF MEmBaRs TO THEIR SEATS IN THE Housa oF REPRESENTATIVES, H. .
REP. No. 6o, 28th Cong., ist Sess. io (1844).
" Id. at 5-6.
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Congress had been granted. And it met head on the Douglas sophistry of Con-
gress being unable to prescribe the limits of state action.
Congress could, in truth, whenever it chose, regulate place40
and in that way limit the discretion of the Legislature... It may regulate time or manner
only; or under the head of manner, it may declare the way in which votes shall be
given; or it may change, where it prevails, the majority principle to that of the plurality
* . . When Congress acts there are not two distinct and independent systems of legisla-
tion, it becomes one; . . . and any alteration it may make of the State laws has the
identical effect it would have if made by the State Legislature.
The capital answer to Douglas came when Davis reminded Congress that the
first section of the Act of i842 was just as incapable of self execution as the second.
There Congress had changed the representation of many states. Such a change was
equally restrictive on legislatures and the constitutional obligations to implement
the two sections were precisely identical. This idea had been stated with great
force two years earlier by John Quincy Adams in a committee report provoked
by President Tyler's expression of doubt of the constitutionality of the Act. The
President admitted, said Adams,4
that the power of Congress, by law, to alter State regulations respecting the manner of
holding elections for Representatives, is clear; but he has felt deep and strong doubts
of the power to command the States to make new regulations, or alter their existing
regulations.
This objection would invalidate every apportionment act which has been prescribed by
Congress during the existence of the Government. Every new apportionment act not
only annuls the regulations provided, by the laws of the several States, to hold elections
of Representatives under the preceding apportionment, but is mandatory to the States
to provide regulations for holding the elections within the State, conformably to the new
apportionment law enacted by Congress. In every successive apportionment law, the num-
ber of Representatives in this House which many of the states have been entitled to send
during the preceding ten years is increased or diminished; and the numerous State Legis-
latures which have been so long waiting for the legislation of Congress at this time and
on this subject, the special extraordinary sessions which more than one of those Legis-
latures have been under the necessity of holding, have all been caused by their indis-
pensable duty to provide regulations for giving effect to the mandatory injunctions of
the congressional law.
The objection to the mandatory character of the law has an aspect so extraordinary as
to be somewhat whimsical, when we consider that the power in Congress, admitted by
the President to be clear, of districting the State by its own authority, is much heavier
and more searching in its operation than that which he considers as so questionable. The
election of Representatives to the national Legislature is not a burden, but a precious
privilege. The geographical division of the territory of the State, according to the
number of the Representatives allowed to the State in this House, is an operation obviously
better suited to the action of the local Legislature than to that of the assembly representing
the whole Union. The assignment of that operation, therefore, to the State Legislatures,
though mandatory in form, is in substance a concession of power; and it is strange, pass-
°lpoirr OF rnE MNoruTy, H. R. REP. No. 6o, 28th Cong., ist Sess. xi (1844).
"H. R. R rp. No. gog, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-o (1842).
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ing strange, to find even the most zealous and most jealous vindicator of State rights
complaining of an investment of authority in the State as a grievous usurpation of authority
of Congress.
For all the bluntness of the Douglas resolution, the result of the controversy in
terms of constitutional interpretation was inconclusive. The Democratic majority,
rather than formally declaring invalid the Act of 1842, contented itself with per-
mitting the general-ticket representatives to serve out their terms.' And, al-
though the requirement for election by districts was on the statute books for nearly
ninety years, Congress never denied seats to representatives elected at large. In this
view, it might be argued that the 1842 Act was, as Douglas said, null and void.
On the other hand, Congress repeatedly manifested a conviction that it had the
power involved. In 1862, it again called for election by districts of contiguous terri-
tory.4 3 In 1872, it added the requirement that districts should contain "as nearly
as practicable" equal numbers of inhabitants.4 4 Similar provisions were incorporated
in the decennial apportionment statutes through 19I1.1 and until the Supreme Court
ruled that the 1929 Act,46 by failing to repeat the customary provisions, had abro-
gated them, the requirements were generally supposed to be in effect 4 7 Furthermore,
on the question of the validity of the 842 statute and its successors, the Supreme
Court in 1879 plainly indicated in ex parte Seibold that the partial quality of the
Congressional action would not render it unconstitutional.
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Indeed, except for the Douglas report of i844, only one other voice with any
authority in the premises has set any recognizable limits on the power of Congress
over Congressional districts. In the contested election case of Davison v. Gilbert in
i9oi, a House Committee went much further than Douglas. Whereas Douglas
practically conceded that Congress might occupy the whole field, laying off districts
itself, the i9oi committee denied the legality of any such action. But it laid more
stress on the policy argument that it would be unwise for Congress to exercise such
control. 9
To summarize, the history of Article I, Section 4 in the Constitutional Convention,
the understanding in the various states when the Constitution was ratified, and the
subsequent legislative experience all lead to the conclusion that Congress may pass
any law in respect to Congressional districts that a state legislature may pass. The
only time this authority has ever been seriously challenged was in the struggle pro-
" CoNo. GLOBE, 28th Cong., ist Sess. 278-280 (1844). At least three of those whose seats were
contested later attained prominence--acob Thompson of Mississippi, Howell Cobb and Alexander
Stephens of Georgia. Stephens made the strange argument that, while he did not believe himself entitled
to his seat, it was really a matter for the House, not him, to decide. Hel would therefore retain his,
seat until the House acted. His speech against his right to be present is reported with maddening in-
completeness. See id. at 253-254.
43 12 STAT. 572 (1862). 44 17 STAT. 28 (1872).
"
5 See 22 STAT. 5 (x882), 26 STAT. 735 (891), 31 STAT. 733 (a9o), and 37 STAT. 13 (ri1).
46 46 STAT. 26 (1929).
'
7 Wood v. Broom, 287 U. S. 1 (1932). 4s 1oo U. S. 37X, 384 (1879).
'
9 H. R. REP. No. 3000, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. (go). Quite a different view was taken by the House
Committee a few years later in the case of Parsons v. Saunders, H. R. REP. No. 1695, 6sst Cong., 2d
Sess. (1909).
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duced by the I842 statute and even there it was conceded that Congress itself might
district the individual states. Nor does there seem to be any constitutional barrier
to Congress exercising its power in respect to a single state only. Congress has
made regulations in respect to the time of Congressional elections applicable to par-
ticular states." Indeed the grant of authority in no way circumscribes Congress.
It may "make or alter" as it pleases. Moreover, it seems clear that the framers ex-
pected Congressional action directed at a single state. It certainly was not anticipated
that there would be a general failure on the part of the states to provide the Con-
gress with Representatives but rather that now and then one state might fail to do so.
Nor was it anticipated that all the states would make improper regulations. Madison
and King referred to a specific problem and their discussion clearly leaves open the
inference that it would be dealt with specifically. And James Wilson took much
the same view in the Pennsylvania convention.5
Three other constitutional issues, all rendered moribund by events, have arisen
in the legislative history of apportionment. One has to do with whether or not a
new apportionment is commanded by the Constitution after each census. There
was no question at all about this for the first one hundred and thirty years of
our Government. But when certain Congressmen were stung by the public criticism
over the failure of Congress to provide for a new apportionment after the 192o
census, the argument was repeatedly made that there was no constitutional duty
to apportion every ten years. This argument was supported by a close reading of
Article I, Section 2. It was said that the ten-year provision was mentioned only in
connection with the census, and that no time limit was attached to the apportion-
ment provision. This position was disputed, of course, and even its adherents con-
ceded that there was a pressing compulsion for decennial action. 2
Politically more potent but even less respectable constitutionally is the position that
Congress may exclude aliens from the enumeration. This has been frequently pro-
posed and many Congressmen have ruefully affirmed that only the barrier of the
Constitution itself prevented their acceptance of the proposal. Others have resorted
to the most tortured arguments to avoid the clear words of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, ex-
cluding Indians not taxed." The easiest answer to any argument on this question
is provided in the history of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. At that
time, a determined effort was made constitutionally to exclude aliens from the
so 17 STAT. 578 (873), 18 STAT. 78 (1874).
I I have heard it surmised by the opponents of this Constitution, that the Congress may order
the election for Pennsylvania to be held at Pittsburg, and thence conclude that it would be improper for
them to have the exercise of the power. But suppose on the other hand, that the assembly should order
an election to be held at Pittsburg; ought not the general government to have the power to alter such
improper election of one of its own constituent parts?" II ELLIoT's DEBATES 441.
C Among others, Senator (now Mr. Justice) Black denied that a decennial reapportionment was
mandatory. See 70 CoNG. REc. 4553 (1929), 7r CoNG. Rac. x846 (1929). In defense of the failure to
reapportion after the x92o census, it was afterwards charged that the enumeration then did not
correctly give the true population figures.
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enumeration. But the effort failed and the Amendment was deliberately worded
to force the continued inclusion of aliens. 3
Finally, it was strenuously contended in the i92o's that Congress could not
constitutionally delegate to the president the authority to make the decennial ap-
portionment. Actually, this feature of the 1929 law contained nothing new in
principle. The Act of i85o had instructed the Secretary of the Interior to do the
same thing, subject, of course, to a Congressional veto. This Act, like its 1929 off-
spring, required only a mathematical calculation in a prescribed manner. Although
the 185o delegation was hardly challenged at all on constitutional grounds, those
opposed to the 1929 law, in their desperate struggle to prevent its enactment, made
much of the point. One of the most vocal of them was Senator Black. He asserted
that the law embodied a principle "which the Anglo-Saxon race has been fighting
since its beginning," that it was to Congress that the power to apportion was con-
fided by the Constitution, and that to place it in the hands of the president would
clearly violate that instrument. 4 The thirty-year acquiescence in presidential ap-
portionment indicates the insubstantial nature of these contentions.
III
Quite naturally, sufferers from grossly unfair apportionments have turned to the
courts for relief. Their pleas have been founded first on an allegation that an act
of Congress has been violated by the questioned apportionment 55 and more lately on
the contention that the Constitution itself forbids an extreme inequality in Con-
gressional districts.56 Giving urgency to such appeals is the argument that for all
practical purposes, only the courts can generate the will to enforce a measure of
"aHoRAcE E. F.AcK, THE ADosnoN op Tm FoRTrErNTH AMENDMENT 99-127 (1908). If Cole
Blease's estimate of the situation in 1929 was correct, the north-eastern states would have lost 35 repre-
sentatives by the exclusion of aliens from the apportionment population. See 71 CoNG. Rac. 1710 (1929).
A move to this effect was supported by Senator Black. See 71 CONG. REC. 2065 (1929).
54 71 CONo. REc. 1612 (1929).
" Wood v. Broom, 298 U. S. 1 (r932). This was an appeal from the District Court in Mississippi
which had enjoined Mississippi officials from conducting elections under a recent Mississippi districting
act. The lower court found that the act did not provide districts approaching the x911 Congressional
standard of equal numbers "as nearly as practicable." The Supreme Court dissolved the injunction and
ordered the complaint dismissed on the ground that the "equal numbers" provision of the 19i1 Act
was no longer in force. Four of the Justices-Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo-agreed in the
result but wanted the complaint dismissed for want of equity. See Bowman, Congressional Redistricting
and the Constitution, 3, MicH. L. Rsv. 149, x68 (932). See also the highly useful work, to which I
am much indebted, L. F. SCsMECcEBIER, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT r45-I49 (194).
" Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 (946). This was an attempt to have the notoriously unfair
Illinois Congressional district arrangement declared invalid. Despite the fact that one district had
something like nine times as many people as another, the Court refused to intervene but only by a
4-3 vote. See the excellent note, Constitutional Right to Congressional Districts of Equal Population, 56
YALE L. J. 127 (r946).
In Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 (932), the Supreme Court did intervene to reverse a Minnesota
court's refusal to dedare invalid a districting act which the governor of the state had not approved
as ordinarily required. The Minnesota court proceeded on the theory that since the Constitution
authorized action by the state "legislature," the governor's approval was unnecessary. The Supreme
Court answered that the term "legislature," as used in Art. IV, §i, referred to the legislative power of
the state however it might be distributed. See also Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 65 (1916) and
Bowman, supra, note 55.
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fairness; that a state legislature which is itself unrepresentative cannot be expected
to district equitably; and that experience has indicated that Congress, for a variety
of reasons, will not provide a remedy. In these circumstances, it is argued, invocation
of the political processes is obviously futile. It is precisely because of the subversion
of these processes that the complainants seek judicial relief.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to intervene even though
confronted with an apportionment act odious to the entire Court. Two factors have
largely been determinative of the Court's attitude: (i) the inability of the Court to
do more than upset a particular districting act and force an election at large; and
(2) the Court's conviction that Congress has the duty under the Constitution of
keeping itself truly representative.
It must be admitted that the remedy available to the Court is of limited efficacy.
An election at large would be totally subversive of the district idea. It would de-
prive sizable minorities of any representation and also distinct localities. In large
states like New York and Illinois, the average voter would be overwhelmed by the
sheer length of the ballot. It would be well nigh impossible for him to distinguish
among so many candidates, most of whom he could hardly be expected to identify.
And even if the Court were able to handle the matter successfully, it could do so
only at the price of coming "into immediate and active relations with party con-
tests." As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said: "The one stark fact that emerges from
a study of the history of Congressional Apportionment is its embroilment in politics,
in the sense of party contests and party interests."' 7
What, then, of the suggestion of the Court that a fair apportionment is a problem
ultimately for Congress alone? The Court has given abundant proof that the
suggestidn is not idly made. While it has never had occasion to chart systematically
the power of Congress over districting within the states, the Court has carefully
refrained from suggesting any limitation. Repeatedly, it has spoken of the power
conferred by Article I, Section 4 in the broadest possible terms. "The Constitution,"
says Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "gives ample power ...The short of it is that the
Constitution has conferred upon Congress exclusive power to secure fair repre-
sentation by the States in the popular House... 58  And as Chief Justice Hughes
has said, "Congress may supplement ...state regulations or may substitute its
own."5 These expressions harmonize perfectly with the general understanding of
1787-88. The problem is one for Congress and if it is to be successfully resolved,
Congress must face up to the responsibility committed to it by the Constitution.
Theoretically, the scheme of the Constitution is a sound one. But its availability
has been minimized by the appearance of national political parties-a development
with which the framers failed to reckon. Yet, according full weight to this factor,
the plan of the Constitution retains its validity. Congress, it is true, has been unable
"' Colegrove v. Green, supra note 56, at 554.
rs Ibid.
"' Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 366-367.
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to act in specific cases when personal and partisan considerations were immanent.
But when calmly reflecting on the requisites of a fair representation, it has repeatedly
asserted itself. It has done away with the general-ticket system almost entirely.
It has called for Congressional districts of compact territory containing approxi-
mately equal numbers. The great difficulty has arisen, not from Congressional
indifference, but rather from the lack of appropriate sanctions. Under the legisla-
tion thus far, the only tool of enforcement has been the House's privilege of refusing
to seat a member from a district not conforming to Congressional standards. It
would be a mistake to suppose that the political factor alone has been responsible
for the House's unwillingness to resort to this extreme. There has been an under-
standable reluctance to deny any representation at all in order to effectuate the
Congressional policy. Moreover, election contests are necessarily prolonged with the
result that the challenged member may well have served much of his term by the
time the investigation is complete and the House is ready to act. And it may be
that any action will come too late for the state legislature involved to take corrective
measures which will apply to the next election.
If Congress once again should undertake to legislate on Congressional districts,
it is imperative that it provide a new mechanism to make its will effective. The
best guide in this respect is the automatic feature of the 1929 Act. By providing
in advance for a determination of the number of representatives to which each
state is entitled, the useless struggles after each census have been avoided. The same
principle could be applied to districts which failed to conform to specific standards
set by Congress. Delinquent states could be identified by an official who would make
purely mathematical calculations. He could, if Congress so authorized, then pro-
ceed to hold Congressional elections on a plan approved by Congress and held in
reserve for just such an occasion. Under such compulsion, the states would almost
certainly accept and honor the responsibility which the Constitution invites them to
share. And Congress, by providing it, would be insuring to the House of Repre-
sentatives its constitutional role of "grand depository of the democratic principle."
